Partner selection is an important process in many s o c i a l i n teractions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment b y r o ving from partner to partner, but defectors in smaller populations risk social isolation. We i n vestigate these possibilities for an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which agents use expected payo s to choose and refuse partners. In comparison to random or round-robin partner matching, we nd that the average payo s attained with preferential partner selection tend to be more narrowly con ned to a few isolated payo regions. Most ecologies evolve to essentially full cooperative b e h a vior, but when agents are intolerant of defections, or when the costs of refusal and social isolation are small, we a l s o see the emergence of wall ower ecologies in which all agents are socially isolated. Between these two extremes, we see the emergence of ecologies whose agents tend to engage in a small number of defections followed by cooperation thereafter. The latter ecologies exhibit a plethora of interesting social interaction patterns.
Introduction
Following the path-breaking work of Axelrod (1984 1987 Axelrod and Dion, 1988 , the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is now commonly used by researchers to explore the potential emergence of mutually cooperative behavior among non-altruistic agents (see, for example, Miller, 1989 and Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994) . These studies have s h o wn that mutually cooperative behavior tends to emerge if the number of game iterations is either unknown or in nite, the frequency of mutually cooperative p l a y in initial game iterations is su ciently high, and the perceived probability of future interactions with any given current opponent is su ciently large.
Most studies of the IPD assume that individual players have n o c o n trol over which opponents they play. P l a yers are matched as game partners either randomly or by means of a deterministic mechanism such as round-robin or grid neighborhood play. In real-life situations, however, agents are not always prisoners who have no alternative but to play t h e i r assigned PD games. Instead, social interactions are often characterized by the preferential choice and refusal of partners. In what ways, then, might the introduction of preferential partner selection change the nature of the IPD?
Previous research suggests that, depending upon the precise population structure, the decision rules used for partner selection, and the penalties imposed for rejected o ers and for deciding not to play, cooperators or defectors may bene t from preferential partner selection. For example, Kitcher (1992) and Schuessler (1989) show that the option of refusing to play previously defecting players can increase the tness of cooperative p l a yers and allow them to invade defecting populations. Orbell and Dawes (1993) argue that it is to the bene t of society as a whole to evolve social structures that allow individuals to opt out of games. Their experiments indicate that humans who are themselves cooperatively inclined tend to be more optimistic about the cooperative i n tentions of other players and hence to play more games. In Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza (1982) , bene cial assortative mixing may occur either because agents playing the same strategy are more likely to encounter each other, or because agents playing cooperative strategies actively select each other.
The ability to actively seek out known cooperators as partners also provides an incentive for agents to be reliably cooperative, so that they will be chosen as partners, and this potentially increases the incidence of cooperation in a society ( T ullock, 1985) . Hirshleifer and Rasmussen (1989) nd that group ostracism can permit cooperative agents to protect themselves from defectors. On the other hand, Dugatkin (1991) shows that the ability to choose partners in large populations divided into isolated patches may permit roving defectors to move from one patch to the next, avoiding ostracism while taking advantage of each patch i n t u r n .
Finally, the introduction of preferential partner selection results in social networks of interacting players. Who chooses whom, and why, a ects who does well, and this in turn a ects the outcomes of the overall game. Questions about social network formation are key to understanding societies. How do groups form? What roles do highly connected individuals play? Social networks are also interesting because they are pathways for the transmission of diseases, information, and cultural traits.
There are several aspects to the partner{selection problem. In this volume, Orbell et al. study strategies that individuals might use to select between strangers, and ask whether it is better for players to pay for information about a stranger or to costlessly assume that they are like themselves. Here we assume that all strangers look the same, and focus more on the question of what individuals do once they have some information about another player.
In a previous paper (Stanley et al., 1994) , we studied an IPD choice and refusal mechanism that combines active c hoice of potential game partners with the ability to refuse play with those judged to be intolerable. Players use continually updated expected payo s to assess the relative desirability of potential partners. This use of expected payo s is meant to capture the idea that players attempt to select partners rationally, using some degree of anticipation, even though they do not know their partners' strategies and payo s. Our choice and refusal mechanism is thus more exible and general than many of the mechanisms studied by previous researchers, although it does not currently allow for the information exchange between players assumed by Kitcher. Also, we considered a single small population, so that defectors cannot rove from one isolated population to the next, as in Dugatkin (1991) , but instead risk eventual ostracism.
In particular, we studied how the ability both to choose and to refuse potential game partners a ects interactions among a small set of simple IPD strategies, and we used a veplayer population to illustrate the formation of social networks. We also conducted a number of evolutionary simulations. The interaction dynamics in both our analytical and simulation studies were seen to be complex, even for small populations. Choice is used by a l l p l a yers to home in quickly on those who will cooperate with them. This permits nice players to interact with each other, but also allows predatory individuals to locate and form long-term relationships with victims within the limit of occasional defection tolerated by the refusal mechanism. On the other hand, refusal ensures that very nasty players do poorly because repeatedly defecting players are typically ostracized as other players increasingly refuse their o ers. Indeed, wall ower populations sometimes emerged in which all players defected until they became solitary, neither making nor accepting game o ers from other players. Overall, however, we observed cooperation to emerge much more quickly and frequently with choice and refusal of partners than with round-robin matching.
In this paper we present a v ariety of new analytical and simulation ndings on the evolutionary IPD with choice and refusal of partners, or evolutionary IPD/CR for short. We rst review in Section 2 the basic structure and implementation of the evolutionary IPD/CR. In particular, we discuss the nite state machines used to represent p l a yers' IPD strategies as well as the genetic algorithm used to evolve the player population from an initial, randomly-chosen population.
Players in our co-evolutionary framework cannot necessarily jump from a defecting mode of behavior to a cooperative one. In particular, the genetic material available in our initial population constrains its future evolution. This path dependence turns out to be particularly important for the interpretation of the IPD/CR simulation studies reported in the present paper, since we w ork with relatively small populations of thirty players. Section 3 thus undertakes an analytical characterization of the distribution of behaviors in the initial player population. In particular, it is shown that a uniformly distributed selection of genetic structures for these players implies a nonuniform selection of their IPD strategies, one that is highly biased towards simple strategies.
In the nal two sections we detail a series of simulation studies that have been conducted to explore the sensitivity o f e v olutionary IPD/CR outcomes to changes in key parameters. In particular, we rst describe one-parameter and two-parameter sensitivity studies for the parameters characterizing the choice and refusal mechanism. W e then report on experiments conducted to test the sensitivity o f o u t c o m e s t o c hanges in the potential complexity o f players' IPD strategies, as measured by t h e n umber of states in their nite state machine representations. Also, we brie y summarize preliminary studies in which t wo k ey parameters characterizing the choice and refusal mechanism are incorporated into the genetic structure of each p l a yer and allowed to evolve o ver time. Finally, w e discuss the sensitivity o f t h e behavioral diversity of our populations to changes in the implementation of the genetic algorithm used to evolve our player populations.
The Evolutionary IPD/CR Simulations
Each simulation discussed in this paper is initialized with a randomly generated population of N players, whose genetic code speci es their strategies for playing an iterated prisoner's dilemma. The simulation then consists of a sequence of generations interspaced with genetic steps. Each generation plays an IPD/CR tournament consisting of I iterations in which the agents choose and refuse partners for prisoner's dilemma games. In the genetic step, the scores from this tournament are used to assess each p l a yer's relative tness and a new population of N players is then generated via a genetic algorithm with crossover and mutation.
Prisoner's Dilemma
The one-shot prisoner's dilemma game is a game between two p l a yers. Each player has two possible moves, cooperate c or defect d, and each p l a yer must move without knowing the move of the other player. If both players defect, each receives a payo D. If both cooperate, each receives a payo C which is strictly greater than D. Finally, if one defects and the other cooperates, the cooperating player receives the lowest possible payo L and the defecting player receives the highest possible payo H, where L < D < C < H . T h e p a yo s are also restricted to satisfy (L + H)=2 < C , s o t h a t u n s y n c hronized alternations of cooperation and defection with the same partner do not yield as high an average payo as repeated mutual cooperation. Table 1 shows the particular values of these payo s u s e d i n o u r s i m ulations, which satisfy these restrictions.
The dilemma in the one-shot PD game is that, if both players defect, both do worse than if both had cooperated, yet there is always an incentive for an individual player to defect. The best response to defection is to defect, because this avoids the lowest payo , L and the best response to cooperation is to defect, because this achieves the highest payo , H. Table 1 : The PD payo matrix for player 1 used in all simulations. Player 1's moves are given across the top and player 2's down the side.
The IPD/CR Tournament
The prisoner's dilemma game applies to a variety of real-world situations in which di erent forms of partner selection occur. Here we consider an abstract model for a broad class of situations where the players interact locally and wish to pair up either with their best choice or with an acceptable choice who approaches them and o ers to interact. A concrete example of this situation might be the dating scene.
Individuals need to use some kind of procedure to determine who to approach, and the acceptability of those who approach them. IPD/CR players do this by k eeping a running average for each other player of the payo s they have received from them. While humans presumably use more complex rules to select partners, incorporating more details about each person they know, this method at least permits players to use some degree of anticipatory behavior in determining their game partners.
It is also assumed that asking someone to interact entails a potential cost {such a s t h e shame of being refused{ whereas being approached is costless. In addition, a (possibly small) cost is imposed on wall ower players who neither make nor accept o ers, which tends to deter this kind of behavior.
We study a slightly simpli ed version of the choice and refusal tournament of Stanley et al. (1994) . Each generation plays a tournament consisting of I iterations. At t h e beginning of each iteration i 1, each player n associates an expected payo with each other player m, denoted by i;1 (mjn). This expected payo is used to determine which players are tolerable as partners and which p l a yer it will choose. Given any player n, another player m is tolerable for player n in iteration i if and only if i;1 (mjn) (1) where is the minimum tolerance level. If any p l a yers are tolerable to player n, t h e n i t makes an o er to the player m for whom its expected payo i;1 (mjn) is highest, with any ties being settled by a random draw.
After these choices are completed, each p l a yer is given an opportunity to refuse o ers. Each player refuses all PD game o ers received from intolerable players and accepts all others. Players cannot opt out of an o er received from a player they judged to be tolerable at the beginning of the iteration. Each time an o er is refused, the player making the o er receives a refusal payo , R. A p l a yer who nds all players intolerable, and thus neither makes nor accepts any o ers, receives a wall ower payo , W. All accepted PD game o ers are then played. Even when two players choose each other, they only play one PD game with each other.
In the initial iteration 1, prior to any i n teractions, all players have the same initial expected p ayo 0 for each player. After this, expected payo s are modi ed whenever two players interact. Consider any t wo p l a yers n and m. I f n neither made nor accepted a PD game o er from m in the current iteration i, t h e n n's expected payo i;1 (mjn) for the play of a PD game with m in iteration i is not changed. On the other hand, suppose player n either receive d a P D p a yo or a refusal payo from interacting with player m. Let this payo be denoted by U. Then player n's expected payo from player m is modi ed by t a k i n g a weighted average over player n's payo history with player m, i (mjn) = ! i;1 (mjn) + ( 1 ; !)U (2) where the memory weight ! controls the relative w eighting of distant to recent p a yo s. 1 In an IPD/CR game, the players have some degree of control over the number of PD games they play|equivalently, o ver the number of moves they make|and players not participating in PD games can still receive w all ower and refusal payo s. Di erent players can therefore end up playing di erent n umbers of games, and not all payo s are associated with game plays. Consequently, at the end of the tournament, we measure the tness of each player by i t s a verage payo score calculated as the total sum of its payo s divided by t h e total number of its payo s. Note that this de nition of tness, combined with the partner selection procedure, implies that an average population tness greater than 3.0 is possible.
Representation of IPD Strategies and Genetic Algorithm
Following previous studies of the evolution of strategies for iterated prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod, 1987 Miller, 1989 Lindgren, 1991 , each p l a yer in our simulations is uniquely associated with a xed deterministic strategy for playing IPD against an arbitrary opponent an indenite number of times, where the only information each p l a yer has about its current PD game partner is its play history with that partner. Its IPD/CR strategy is then determined by its nite state machine together with the choice and refusal procedure and parameters described above.
We h a ve implemented our model in two di erent codes, which use di erent deterministic nite state machine structures: Moore machines as implemented in Miller (1989) and Mealy machines with a predetermined initial state, which w e will refer to as IPD machines 2 and which are illustrated in Figure 2 . Each of these structures allows a player to use a variable amount of its play history with each partner to determine its moves in plays with that partner.
Pseudo-code for a single run.
Initialization.
Choose , 0 , !, R, W, a n d t h e n umber of IPD machine states. For each o f n = 1 : ::30 players do
Create an IPD machine with uniformly distributed valid entries. For each p l a yer m 6 = n Set (mjn) t o 0 , Set state of player n with respect to player m to the initial state. End for. Set fitness(n) a n d num payoffs(n) t o 0 . End for.
Main Loop. Mutating a player (IPD machine).
With probability 5 in 1000, invert the initial action. For each arrow, with probability 5 in 1000, use uniform random selection to determine a new destination state. For each arrow label, with probability 5 in 1000, invert the action. Return A player makes an initial move, either cooperate c or defect d, and then enters the initial state 1 this initial move is indicated next to the arrow e n tering state 1. Once the player has arrived at a current state, its next move is conditioned on the previous move of its partner as well as on the current state. This move sequence then determines a transition to a new state. A transition to a new state is indicated by an arrow, and the move sequence or sequences that result in this transition are indicated beside the arrow i n a m o ve-slash-move format. The previous move of the partner appears to the left of the slashmark and the next move o f the player appears to the right of the slashmark.
The representation of IPD strategies a ects various aspects of our evolutionary study, including the distribution of behaviors in the initial randomly-chosen population of players and the manner in which recombination and mutation create new players. Our use of two di erent representations has resulted in generally similar experimental outcomes, although some subtle di erences have been detected. We h a ve t h us checked to some extent that our experimental outcomes are not simply artifacts arising from our particular choice of representation.
Unless otherwise noted, the simulation results reported in this paper are based on the IPD machine representation shown in Figure 2 . However, many of these results have a l s o been veri ed using Moore machines.
The genetic structure of each player is a bit string which encodes its IPD or Moore machine. In the oating -! studies this genetic structure is augmented with either the or the ! values. This genetic structure determines its behavior under each possible set of circumstances, but players with di erent genetic structures can be observationally equivalent in the context of our IPD/CR game.
At the end of each tournament, the current generation of N players is transformed into a new player population of the same size via a genetic algorithm that uses elitism, crossover, and mutation and this new population then engages in another IPD/CR tournament.
More precisely, at the beginning of the genetic step, each p l a yer in the current population is assigned a tness equal to its average payo score per payo received. Copies of the X most t players are retained in the next generation, and the bottom N ; X players are replaced by o spring of the top X players.
Parents are selected by means of a roulette wheel selection (Goldberg, 1989, p. 11) . Two parents are selected (N ; X)=2 times from the top X players with a probability directly proportional to their relative tness. A player is allowed to mate with itself. The recombination (crossover) of two I P D m a c hine parents is accomplished as follows. Unless otherwise stated, each machine has 16 states and is coded as a string consisting of 161 bits. (The rst bit speci es the initial move, bits 2-129 are used for the 32 state transition arrows, each o f w h i c h uses four bits to specify the next state, and bits 130-161 are used by the 32 arrow labels, which each use one bit to specify the move c or d.) We generate a random variable q that is distributed uniformly over the discrete range 1 2 : : : 161. The bits in positions q through 161 of the parental bit strings are exchanged to obtain the bit strings for two o spring.
Next, the bit strings of these two o spring are subjected to mutation. For the initial move and the 32 arrow labels, each bit is ipped with probability . F or the 32 state transition arrows, mutation of the state transition arrow (i.e. all four bits) occurs with probability and, once a state transition arrow has been selected for mutation, a uniformly distributed random value is selected from the discrete range 1 2 : : : 16 and coded as a new four-bit representation for the state transition arrow. 3 The probability that one or more mutation operators are applied to a given o spring is 0.0165.
Distribution of Behavior in the Initial Population
Our player populations are small, implying that only a small subset of possible IPD strategies tends to be explored in each run. This is especially true given our small mutation rate. The genetic material available in the initial population is therefore one crucial factor determining the behavior of any speci c run. In particular, at low v alues of ! the wall ower ecologies we describe in the next section are only observed when the expected number of mutually cooperative individuals in the initial population is small. Moreover, our initial set of IPD strategies is not chosen from a uniform distribution of all possible IPD strategies. Instead, selecting each a r r o w and each arrow label from a uniform distribution creates an initial distribution of IPD strategies that is highly biased towards simple strategies.
In this section we determine the probability that a randomly chosen IPD machine, as described in section 2.3, exhibits a given ty p e o f s e l f p l a y in an IPD game play against a clone of itself. We also determine the expected number of self-cooperators.
By construction, all moves in the self-play of an IPD machine are synchronized, either both c or both d. F urthermore, some move and its associated state must eventually recur in self play, after which the machine will loop endlessly through the interim sequence of moves and states. The self-play behavior of these IPD machines can therefore be characterized by a self-play string of the form A:B, where A and B are strings consisting of c and d moves that are associated with state transitions. The string A represent s a s e r i e s o f m o ves (and state transitions) made initially in self play but not repeated, while B represents a series of moves (and state transitions) that the IPD machine repeats thereafter. The string A always contains at least the initial move because it is unrepeatable. Likewise, B always contains at least one entry, a m o ve whose associated state transition arrow points to the same state as the state transition arrow associated with the last entry in A.
To illustrate the point that each e n try of a self-play string represent s b o t h a m o ve a n d a state transition, consider the two self-play strings c:c and c:cc. Both represent pure selfcooperation, but an IPD machine with the former string uses only one state in its self play while one with the latter string uses at least two. This distinction is nontrivial at the level of evolution. An examination of their diagrams shows that the self-play s t r i n g o f a n I P D machine with a c:c self-play string can only be a ected by t h r e e p o i n t m utations (changing either the initial or the second c, o r c hanging the destination of the arrow marked c=c out of the initial state) while the c:cc self-play string can be modi ed by v e di erent m utations. Lemma 1. There are 2 (2n) 2n distinct possible speci cations for an n-state IPD machine. Proof:
The IPD machine has n states and an initial move. For each state, the IPD machine must react to either a c or a d input, thus two arrows corresponding to these two possible inputs must be speci ed. An arrow m ust go to one of n states and be labeled with one of two m o ves, implying there are 2n di erent w ays to specify a given arrow. The total number of arrows in an n-state IPD machine is 2n, not counting the arrow p o i n ting to the initial state, so we h a ve ( 2 n) 2n ways to specify them. Multiplying this by the two possible initial moves gives the desired formula. 2 Theorem 1.
Let S=A:B denote a self-play string, and let x y z 2 f c dg denote, respectively, the rst n!(n ; 1)! (n ; n c + z = c])!(n ; n d + z = d])! :
We start by counting the number of ways to place the arrows labeled with the entries of the self-play string.
The rst entry of the self play string involves no choice its arrow points to state 1 and is labeled x. F or each subsequent e n try of the self-play string, apart from the last entry, t h e arrow labeled with that entry leads from the current state and the state to which the arrow points may b e f r e e l y c hosen from those states that do not yet have a n a r r o w with the same label pointing at them. The arrow for the last entry in the self-play string must point t o t h e same state as the arrow corresponding to the move immediately preceding the colon in the self-play string.
This means we make an ordered choice of (n c ; x = c]; z = c]) states out of (n; x = c])
to be the head states of the arrows corresponding to cooperation and an ordered choice of
states out of (n ; x = d]) to be the head states of the arrows corresponding to defection. The subtraction of x = c] and x = d] from the set of available states takes into account that the initial move uses up one of the moves that could otherwise be associated with the initial state. The subtraction of z = c] and z = d] from the set of arrows that need head states re ects the fact that the head state of the last arrow is dictated by the position of the colon in S. Since states may be the heads of a c arrow a n d / o r a d arrow, the choices are independent and the total number of choices is (n ; x = c])!(n ; x = d])! (n ; n c + z = c])!(n ; n d + z = d])! : (4) Since exactly one of x = c] and x = d] is 1, the numerator can be simpli ed to n!(n;1)!. This transforms the above t o n!(n ; 1)! (n ; n c + z = c])!(n ; n d + z = d])! : (5) Any n-state IPD machine has a total of 2n arrows, not counting the arrow associated with the initial move. We explicitly chose the description of n c + n d ; 1 of these arrows in the course of laying out the self-play string. If y = z, t h e n w e h a ve c hosen enough arrows to ensure that the IPD machine will exhibit the desired self play but, if y 6 = z, t h e n w e must ensure that the head state of the state transition arrow associated with y transits to the same next state, and is labeled with the same move, regardless of whether the previous move w as a c or a d (i.e., regardless of whether this head state is being entered from y or from z). This requires that we ll in one additional arrow description.
Thus, the total number of arrow descriptions lled in during the course of specifying the self-play string is n c + n d + y 6 = z] ; 1. This leaves 2n ; n c ; n d ; y 6 = z] + 1 arrow descriptions to be lled in. Since there are 2n di erent w ays to ll in each arrow description, we see that there are (2n) 2n;nc;n d ; y6 =z]+1 (6) additional choices not associated with specifying the self-play string. Multiplying the choices yields the desired formula (3). 2 Corollary 1.
If n c , n d , x, y, and z are as in Theorem 1, then the probability of a randomly-generated IPD machine having a given self-play string A:B is n!(n ; 1)! 2 (2n) (nc+n d + y6 =z];1) (n ; n c + z = c])!(n ; n d + z = d])! : (7) Proof:
Divide equation 3 by the total number of possible IPD machines computed in Lemma 1.
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Call an IPD machine self-cooperative or self-defecting if its self-play string consists entirely of c or d moves, respectively. The next result is valid for both self-cooperative a n d self-defecting IPD machines:
Theorem 2.
The probability that a randomly-generated IPD machine is self-cooperative i s n X l=1 (n ; 1)! l 2 (2n) l (n ; l)! : (8) Proof:
With an initial move t h a t m ust come before the colon, and up to n states corresponding to other potential moves in the self-play string, at least one of which m ust come after the colon, we see that the number l of entries in a self-play string consisting entirely of c moves is in the range 2 l n + 1. Moreover, in a string with l such e n tries, there are l ; 1 places to put the colon.
The index of summation will run across the number of possible entries in a completely cooperative self-play string, minus one. Fo r a g i v en l and colon position, formula (7) may be lled in with n c = l, n d = 0 , a n d x = y = z = c to yield the probability n!(n ; 1)! 2 (2n) (l;1) (n ; l + 1)!(n)! : (9) Since there are l ; 1 places the colon could be placed, the probability o f a n I P D m a c hine having a self-play string with l cooperates and no defects is, after cancellation, (n ; 1)!(l ; 1) 2 (2n) (l;1) (n ; l + 1)! : (10) If we then sum over the possible values of l and correct the index to run from 1 to n, we obtain formula (8). 2
For later purposes, Table 2 computes the expected number of self-cooperative n-state IPD machines in a randomly-chosen population of size thirty.
To recap, Lemma 1 counts the total number of IPD machines with n states. Theorem 1 counts the number of n-state IPD machines that have a g i v en self-play string. In Corollary 1 w e obtain the probability that a random IPD machine will have a given self-play string. Finally, in Theorem 2 we s u m o ver all purely cooperative self-play strings to obtain the probability that a random IPD machine will be self cooperative.
The results in this section have t wo important implications. First, the use of uniform selection to determine arrows and arrow labels for the initial population of IPD machines strongly favors short self-play strings. Since the initial population contains the genetic material available for evolution, and only mutations can introduce new material, this bias probably a ects the evolutionary paths explored by our system. Second, as will be discussed in Section 5.2.2, in some parameter regimes the emergence of wall ower ecologies decreases as the expected number of self-cooperative p l a yers in the initial population increases. Here n Probability Expectation n Probability Expectation 1 0. Table 2 : The probability that a randomly generated n-state IPD machine will be selfcooperative, and the expected number of self-cooperative ones out of thirty.
we h a ve only addressed the initial distribution of self-play strings. However, the rate at which e v olution drives our populations to a state where most players are genetically similar (see Smucker et al. (1994) ) makes the self-play string determine much of the behavior of many ecologies.
Simulation Findings: Overview
In preliminary IPD/CR simulation studies reported in Stanley et al. (1994) , we found that the overall emergence of cooperation was faster with choice and refusal than with round-robin partner selection as used in Miller (1989) . As well, the initial dip in overall average tness was either much more shallow or missing entirely. Although a large number of ecologies emerged that were essentially mutually cooperative, other ecologies had an average tness that remained nearly constant for many generations at levels below the mutual cooperation payo , o r w h i c h displayed other fairly regular payo patterns. Interestingly, when we o verlaid the average tnesses from di erent runs at the same parameter values, the average tnesses often clustered around a small number of values.
These general ndings continue to hold for the more extensive studies reported in the present paper. Indeed, the enhancement of the emergence of cooperation appears even more dramatic when we compare our results to random rather than to round-robin partner selection, a more appropriate comparison because the total number of games played is more similar. In this section we present a b r i e f o verview of these and other simulation ndings. A more detailed discussion is given in Section 5.
When partners are chosen randomly and no refusal is allowed, many populations never evolve to full cooperation. On the other hand, only a small fraction evolve to full defection the rest go to meta-stable states which lie between these two cases. As depicted in Figure  3(b) , these e ects show up visually as either noisy horizontal lines or thin bands when the average tness for 40 runs with 40 di erent random seeds are graphically superimposed. Some of these are easy to understand: 3.0 re ects fully cooperative p l a y 2.8 is a population W = 1 . 6 Memory Weight: ! = 0.7 Number of Elite X = 2 0 Mutation Probability = 5/1000 Table 3 : Parameter Settings for the Standard IPD/CR Scenario in which each player defects exactly once against each other player and so on. The overall average tness (i.e., the average of the average tness across the 40 runs) stays well below 3.0, the full-cooperation payo (see Figure 3(a) ).
Contrast this with Figure 4 , which depicts the average tnesses of 40 di erent r u n s a t t h e standard IPD/CR parameter settings speci ed in Table 3 . Once again, not all populations evolve to full cooperation. In nearly all of these partially noncooperative e v olved populations each player defects, on average, only once against each other player. Thus, while horizontal bands are evident in both Figure 3 (b) and Figure 4 (b), the average tnesses for the latter case tend to cluster in just two n a r r o w regions and the overall average tnesses achieved for the standard IPD/CR scenario are higher than for random choice. Figure 4 illustrates a commonly observed con guration for average tnesses in the evolutionary IPD/CR: values clustered fairly tightly into a small number of narrow regions. For some parameter settings, however, the number of of these regions can be large and more di usely distributed. Also, choice and refusal can lead to situations where the players defect against each other a small number of times and then cease game play altogether, becoming wall owers. The latter situation happens, for example, when the standard IPD/CR scenario is perturbed in any of the following three ways: the refusal payo is increased until being refused becomes an attractive alternative t o m utual defection the memory weight i s l o wered until cooperators refuse to tolerate even a single defection or the wall ower payo is increased to a level lying only slightly below t h e m utual cooperation level. The rst two cases are illustrated by Figures 5 and 6 , respectively.
Despite attaining similar average tnesses, the populations with average tnesses in any one region consist of genetically diverse players with interaction patterns peculiarly adapted to the choice and refusal mechanism. F or example, as described further in Section 5, the source of the spiking in average tnesses from 2.69 to 3.0 observed in Figure 4 is an intricate dance between one set of initially rapacious but ultimately love-struck p l a yers (\Bobs") and another set of temptingly cooperative p l a yers (\Raquels"). A more detailed examination of the fascinating social network structures arising in the evolutionary IPD/CR is given in a companion paper (Smucker et al., 1994) . These structures are strongly reminiscent o f t h e social network structures observed in real-world settings.
If the choice and refusal parameters and ! are allowed to evolve o ver time along with the players' IPD strategies, then populations frequently evolve t o b e i n tolerant o f a n y player who defects even once against a cooperator. Interestingly, as discussed more carefully in Section 5, the populations with evolved and ! values tend to achieve a verage tnesses lying between those of populations with xed choice and refusal parameters and those attained by populations using random partner choice. However, the variety of behaviors observed in the populations with evolved and ! values is just as great as for the populations with xed choice and refusal parameters.
Simulation Studies: Detailed Results
In this section we detail a variety o f s i m ulation studies that have been conducted to explore the sensitivity of IPD/CR evolutionary outcomes to changes in key parameters. We start by explaining the concept of a tness region, used below to aid the reporting of our simulation ndings.
Fitness Regions
As seen in Section 4, the average tnesses achieved by successive generations in runs of the evolutionary IPD/CR from di erent initial random seeds tend to cluster around a small number of levels. We refer to these levels as regions D 0 , D 1 ,: : :. Region D n is the cluster of average tnesses roughly centered around the average tness achieved by a homogeneous (genetically identical) population whose self-play string A:B consists of an initial string A of n defections followed by a string B consisting entirely of cooperations. Thus, region D 0 is the tness cluster roughly centered around the average tness 3.0 of a homogeneous population with a self-play string c:c : : : c , region D 1 is roughly centered around the average tness of a homogeneous population with self-play string d:c : : : c , and so forth.
Note that the precise average tness anchoring a region D j with j > 0 depends on the IPD/CR parameter settings. For example, given the standard settings in Table 3 with I = 150 iterations between genetic steps, the average tness anchoring D 1 is 2.69 (deriving this value is nontrivial (Smucker et al., 1994) ) but this average tness increases monotonically to 3:0 a s I becomes arbitrarily large. Also, the player populations of the ecologies lying within a particular tness region can vary enormously from one another and, even for any o n e o f these ecologies, the successive generations are rarely homogeneous. For example, region D 1 may contain ecologies consisting of a homogeneous population of players having a self-play string cd:c, ecologies consisting of a mixed population of players having self-play strings d:c and dc:c, a s w ell as ecologies consisting of a homogeneous population having a self-play string d:c Finally, the tness cluster centered roughly around the wall ower payo W will be referred to as the wall ower region. The ecologies falling in this region typically consist of player populations that initially engage in mutual defections and ultimately end up as wall owers.
Sensitivity to Changes in the IPD/CR Parameters
A series of sensitivity experiments were conducted for various subsets of the IPD/CR parameters, keeping all remaining parameters at their standard IPD/CR scenario settings as listed in Table 3 . In all experiments except the oating case reported later, the wall ower payo W was set equal to . 4 As will be seen below, an important implication of these sensitivity experiments is that the IPD/CR parameters , !, a n d 0 have closely coupled e ects on the evolution of player populations. Figure 7 describes how the mean and standard deviation of average tnesses change when the minimum tolerance level , the memory weight !, the initial expected payo 0 , and the refusal payo R are varied one at a time from their standard scenario settings. For each tested parameter con guration, 40 runs were made using 40 di erent initial random seeds, resulting in 40 distinct ecologies, and each run consisted of 50 generations of players. The mean average tnesses m for the nal 25 generations are indicated by squares, and the dispersion of each m e a n m is indicated by an error bar giving a range of plus or minus one standard deviation about this mean. 5 As seen in part (d) of Figure 7 , m drops precipitously in response to increases in the refusal payo , R, because nearly all populations evolve i n to wall ower ecologies. Surprisingly, however, parts (a) through (c) indicate that increases in , !, o r 0 have little e ect on m. In particular, the player populations for the nal 25 generations are more cooperative o n average than the populations evolved with random partner choice compare Figure 3 . As seen in part (b), this remains true even when the memory weight ! is set at 0:9, implying that players only gradually move a way from the common expected payo 0 they initially have for all potential game partners. 6 In contrast, the average standard deviation, , tends to increase with increases in 0 or R, and also to vary signi cantly in response to increases in and !, rst decreasing and then increasing. These ndings are consistent with the following observations. With low , high !, and high 0 , although D 0 and D 1 tness regions are evident, many ecologies persist outside these regions in no discernible pattern. As illustrated in Figure 8 , this results in a large dispersion in average tnesses. In contrast, for more intermediate parameter settings, near the standard scenario values and for low 0 , almost all ecologies lie within either the D 0 or the D 1 tness regions, implying a relatively smaller dispersion in average tnesses. Finally, for high and low !, the ecologies tend to divide between the cooperative tness region D 0 and the wall ower tness region, resulting once again in a rather large dispersion in average tnesses. Table 4 provides a more detailed description of the one-parameter sensitivity outcomes summarized in Figure 7 for , !, 0 , and R. Caution must be exercised in interpreting these results the somewhat di erent outcomes observed in the four di erent 40-run experiments undertaken at standard scenario parameter settings (see = 1 . 6 , ! = 0 . 7 , 0 = 3.0, and R = 1.0) indicate that our sample size is too small to ensure that all interesting phenomena that can occur at a particular parameter setting are actually in evidence. Table 5 reports results for a two-parameter sensitivity study in which and 0 were varied together. As before, 40 runs were made for each tested parameter con guration, and each run consisted of 50 generations.
The parameter 0 determines the initial reactions of the players to each other. As seen in Tables 4 and 5 , signi cant c hanges in evolutionary outcomes often occur when 0 deviates from the mutual cooperation payo 3.0. A value of 0 greater than 3.0 encourages players to experiment b y p l a ying games with many new partners, while a value of 0 lower than 3.0 encourages players to stick with those they have already played.
The exogenously chosen initial expected payo 0 can be dead wrong as an assessment o f a potential partner. Therefore, a player's memory as embodied in its current expected payo s can be tantamount t o f a n tasy. The memory weight !, w h i c h w eights past expected payo s relative to newly obtained payo s in each p l a yer's updating algorithm (2), can thus play an important role in o setting or amplifying unwarranted optimism or pessimism stemming from an inappropriate setting for 0 .
In particular, given standard scenario settings for other parameter values, dramatic changes occur in evolutionary outcomes when ! is set low enough that any defection against a cooperation results in immediate refusal of all future PD-game o ers. As seen in Table 4 Table 4 : One-parameter sensitivity results. \Minimum" is a rough characterization of the minimum average tness achieved by a n y of the 40 ecologies after an initial transient stage (determined by inspection), and gives a crude sense of the level of cooperation evinced. The phenomena columns indicate the various behaviors observed for the 40 ecologies, roughly in order of their frequency. D n = tness region n, W = w all ower region, C = a n e c o l o g y which persists for a long time whose dominant subpopulation has a self-play string with a short cyclic section, and O = other ecologies with nearly constant tness across many generations. Also, N = noisy average tness plots with no discernible patterns, J = spiking observed in average tness, and L = a late-appearing wall ower ecology. A small n in front of a phenomenon indicates that it was evident amidst some amount of noise, and a subscript m on a phenomenon indicates that only m cases were observed. Table 4 for a key. E a c h b o x reports the minimum average tness for generations 25-50 as well as key observed phenomena. random partner choice, and it might therefore be anticipated that the behaviors observed at high ! values will mimic those observed for random partner choice. But it is only at the very highest tested value of !, 0.9, that we s e e a n y h i n t of the wide dispersion in average tnesses that occurs for random partner choice, as depicted in Figure 3 (b) and, even for this high ! value, no ecologies inhabiting the tness regions D n with n > 2 are observed.
The sensitivity results reported in Table 4 for the refusal payo R reveal two regions of distinct behavior, splitting roughly at R = 2 :0. When R is below 2.0, refusal is avoided by the players and wall ower ecologies are absent. As R increases, however, players tantalized by high R payo s often defect their way i n to a wall ower ecology. Thereafter, they only obtain R payo s when the population is invaded by a m utant cooperator.
In the next several subsections we examine more closely the behavioral phenomena highlighted in Tables 4 and 5.
The Cooperative Fitness Region D 0
Ecologies whose average tnesses lie in the D 0 region consist largely of players engaging in mutual cooperation, apart from an occasional mutant. As indicated in Tables 4 and 5 , such ecologies have appeared for almost every parameter setting we h a ve tested. 7 Indeed, for most parameter settings, a substantial number of ecologies approach this tness region within the rst fteen generations. In general, the greater the fraction of ecologies that lie within the tness region D 0 , the more time they spend there and the higher is their attained average tness, m. When all players engage in mutual cooperation, only three types of player interaction patterns are possible. If the initial expected payo 0 equals the mutual cooperation payo 3:0, then potential PD game partners always have an expected payo equal to 3:0 and each player is indi erent concerning whom it plays. In this case the partner selection mechanism reduces to random choice. If 0 is greater than 3:0, players keep selecting new partners in a round-robin fashion as they experience disappointment from their lower than expected mutual cooperation payo s. If 0 is less than 3:0, each player latches onto the rst individual it plays since its updated expected payo for this partner will rise above the payo 0 it expects from each other partner. The D 0 tness region is visually noisy when ecologies persistently move in and out of the region, or when other ecologies persist at nearby a verage tness levels. This situation is indicated by nD 0 in Tables 4 and 5.
The Wall ower Fitness Region
The next most easily understood tness region is the wall ower region. The ecologies falling within this region typically comprise players that initially defect against all other players, ultimately decide that each other player is intolerable, and thereafter collect only wall ower payo s. Such ecologies are easily detected because they persist for a long time with an average tness that is near the wall ower payo W.
Two situations encourage wall ower ecologies to emerge and persist: positive i n c e n tive (a high W or R value) and quick refusal of defectors (a high value). In simulation experiments in which neither of these holds, we rarely observe the emergence of wall ower ecologies. On the other hand, when R is set su ciently high, almost all ecologies in our sensitivity experiments evolve i n to wall ower ecologies. Also, keeping W set equal to , and setting high, some (but not all) ecologies evolve i n to wall ower ecologies. It may seem counterintuitive that a high R value results in more wall ower ecologies than a high value since synchronized play behavior is commonly observed, and players engaging in such b e h a vior never receive refusal payo s from each other. However, with a high R value, defectors score very well whenever cooperators are present. Thus defectors tend to take o ver the population and prevent m utant cooperative p l a yers from invading.
Given 0 = 3.0 and > 2.1, with ! set at its standard scenario value of 0:7, a cooperating player will immediately refuse all further play w i t h a p l a yer who defects on its rst move against it. This immediate refusal in response to an initial sucker payo of 0 increases the probability t h a t a w all ower ecology will emerge. It also suggests why, i n g e n e r a l , w all ower ecologies are observed in the two-parameter experiments of Table 5 only for the higher values of for each given value of 0 for the appearance of wall ower ecologies in this table is roughly tracing out the boundary in the 0 { plane between immediate refusal and no immediate refusal in response to an initial 0 payo , given ! = 0 . 7 . When 0 < 3.0, however, the explanation for the emergence of wall ower ecologies is actually more subtle than this discussion suggests, for a player's expected payo then increases with each new mutual cooperation payo , 3, that it receives. Thus, a sucker payo , 0, or a m utual defection payo , 1, received on the rst move with another player might result in refusal of all further play, but refusal of further play m i g h t not occur if such p a yo s are only received following a string of mutual cooperation payo s. For example, as indicated in Table 5 , wall ower ecologies were not observed when 0 and were both set at 1:6, even though a 0 payo on either the rst or the second move a l w ays evokes immediate refusal in this case (but a 0 payo on the third move need not).
In general, our ndings suggest that wall ower ecologies primarily occur in the region of the parameter space for , !, a n d 0 where players are relatively intolerant of defections. In order to quantify this intolerance region, let (Z) denote the expected payo that a player i has for another player j after receiving a string of payo s Z from j, and let Q(Z) = (Z)= . By construction, player i will refuse all further game o ers from player j if and only if Q(Z) is less than 1, implying that i nds j intolerable. Given any Z, the , 0 , and ! parameter space can then be partitioned into intolerance and tolerance regions characterized by Q(Z) < 1 and Q(Z) 1, respectively.
Our simulation ndings regarding the emergence of wall ower ecologies in the case 0 < 3.0 can now be summarized as follows. Using fL D C Hg to denote the PD game payo s f0 1 3 5g, w all ower ecologies rarely evolve i n s i m ulations for which the IPD/CR parameters satisfy 0 < C , Q(L) < 1, Q(CL) < 1, and Q(CCL) 1. However, we o b s e r v e at least some ecologies evolving into wall ower ecologies when 0 < C and Q(CCL) < 1. For example, given ! = 0.6 and = W = 1 . 6 , t h e v alue Q(CCL) = 1 occurs at 0 = 2.07. In simulation experiments with ! = 0.6 and = W = 1 . 6 , w all ower ecologies emerged when 0 was set at 1.90 or 2.05 but not when 0 was set at 2.10 or 2.20. We also hypothesize that the probability an ecology will evolve i n to a wall ower ecology depends in part on the initial player population. In particular, suppose parameter values are set so that players in the initial population that do not mutually cooperate are rather quickly reduced to wall owers and any single cooperator cannot outscore defectors in an otherwise defecting population. Then defectors will take o ver unless there are two or more cooperators in the initial population for any time a single cooperator appears via mutation and crossover, it will immediately fail to propagate. On the other hand, if a single cooperator can outscore an otherwise defecting initial population, then cooperators will eventually have o spring with whom they can cooperate, do even better, and take o ver.
Interestingly, for populations of size 30 it follows from Table 2 that initial populations whose players have 16-state IPD machine representations include on average only 1.47 players whose self-play string is purely cooperative, whereas populations whose players have one-state IPD machine representations have a m uch greater expected number of self-play cooperators, 7.5. The probability that an initial population will have more than one player that consistently cooperates with large numbers of other players is thus much greater in the one-state case. It follows from the previous discussion that the evolution of wall ower ecologies should be a more common occurrence in our 16-state simulations than in our one-state simulations, and this is certainly supported by our simulation ndings. As will be discussed further below, no wall ower ecologies have been observed in our one-state simulations.
It also follows that wall ower ecologies will be less likely to emerge when the population size is increased. This hypothesis was tested by c hoosing two of the parameter settings where wall ower ecologies were seen, but incentives were nonexistent: namely, ! = 0 :3 and ! = 0 :4 with other parameters at standard values. The population size was doubled to N = 60, giving an expected number of 2.94 self-cooperators in the initial population. The number of iterations was increased to 400 to ensure that all players had a chance to test all other players. As expected, no wall ower ecologies were seen.
The Intermediate Fitness Region D 1
In our one-parameter and two-parameter sensitivity experiments, the D 1 region is absent f o r low o r i n termediate values of the initial expected payo , 0 , or for parameter settings where mutual defection results in immediate play stoppage|for example, where is at least 2:4 and all other parameters are set at standard scenario levels. Otherwise, at least some hint of the region is evident, even when the number I of iterations in the standard scenario is increased to 400 so that the average tness anchoring D 1 is close to the average tness 3.0 that (always) anchors D 0 .
The D 1 region encompasses a whole host of ecologies in addition to the canonical case where players mutually defect once but otherwise mutually cooperate. Many D 1 ecologies consist of two or more distinct, repeatedly-interacting subpopulations that appear to be meta-stable in the following sense: they emerge and persist for many generations, and they resist invasion by a large range of mutants.
The social networks formed by the populations inhabiting the D 1 ecologies were studied by considering the players as nodes in a fully connected graph. An edge in the graph represented an interaction between two p l a yers, and was initially assigned a zero strength. The strength of an edge connecting any t wo p l a yers increased by one each time the players engaged in a PD game. To obtain a clearer visualization of the more persistent social interactions, edge strengths that fell below a certain minimum number at the end of a simulation run were set to zero and the remaining edge strengths were set to one.
Our simulation studies show that the social networks (graphs) determined in this manner for D 1 ecologies can take on an astonishing variety of forms: small, isolated networks linked stars, where a few cooperative players are chosen by all other players unlinked stars, where the players forming the center nodes of the stars nd each other intolerable a completely connected central network of players together with an outer layer of players, each linked to only one player in the central network and tree-shaped networks. In many cases, the rst 10 to 50 iterations are apparently used by p l a yers to \get to know e a c h other," after which t h e social network settles into a seemingly stable con guration. In other cases, however, a social network may persist in one form for a number of generations and then transit to a di erent form, or it may simply never settle down. New social networks are still being discovered.
As these ndings suggest, the D 1 region tends to be thick: most of the ecologies in this region do not have a n a verage tness at the canonical D 1 value, just one close to this value. Indeed, one of the ecologies that commonly adds mass and visual impact to the D 1 region, Raquel-and-the-Bobs, has a tness trace that leaps out of the region at random intervals to slightly above 3.0 and then falls back. See, for example, Figure 4 . A more detailed study of this and other social networks arising in the evolutionary IPD/CR can be found in Smucker et al. (1994) , but a general description of Raquel-and-the-Bobs will now b e g i v en.
This whimsically-named ecology is best described as the intertwining of two i n teraction patterns repeatedly arising from one another. The rst interaction pattern occurs when an essentially homogeneous population of \Bobs" evolves. Each Bob has a self-play string containing a single defection at or near the beginning of the self play string, e.g. d:c, a n d the property t h a t a p o i n t m utation or crossover can easily produce a \Raquel" which i s self-cooperative and which also cooperates at all times with a Bob. The population of Bobs obtains an average tness in the D 1 region. A population of Bobs will play with a typical search and latch pattern { a Bob resents the initial defection and keeps searching until it has played all other players once. After that point, it will latch o n to the player it has played the largest number of times.
The Bobs hum along from generation to generation until one of their o spring is a Raquel, ushering in the second interaction pattern. The payo of ve units that a Bob receives from a Raquel when Bob defects and Raquel cooperates causes each Bob to immediately latch onto Raquel when it plays Raquel for the rst time.
The result of this is that Raquel plays a large number of cooperative games after the initial defect with every Bob in the population and ends up, due to unavoidable stochastic Bob-on-Bob defections in the initial play, with the highest tness. The population average tness also rises { not all possible Bob-on-Bob defections occur anymore { and a spike i n the tness trace starts.
Raquel has the highest tness, so it has o spring. Since the expressed part of Raquel's genome is usually quite small, the probability is high that Raquel's o spring will also be Raquels. As a result, the number of Raquels increases. With multiple Raquels, a Bob nds a Raquel sooner and gets fewer defection payo s from other Bobs. Even though a Bob wants to latch o n to the rst Raquel it nds, the Raquels keep searching the population (at least when 0 3). Thus each B o b e v entually nds all the Raquels and obtains the payo of 5 once for each Raquel. As a result, the population average tness is raised again. Once enough Raquels have e n tered the population, the Bobs' tnesses surpass Raquels'. At t h i s point, given our elitism in reproduction, the Raquels are always decimated and usually wiped out. This causes the falling leg of the spike i n t h e a verage tness trace. Figure 9 shows the interaction of a population when there are three Raquels.
Other Phenomena
Reviewing Tables 4 and 5 , it is apparent that the tness region D 2 is much less in evidence than the wall ower region or the regions D 0 and D 1 . T ypically, only one or two ecologies persist in this region even when it is observed. As for D 1 , the D 2 ecologies that have been observed exhibit a wide variety of behaviors. The tness region D 3 a p p e a r s t o b e e v en rarer than D 2 , perhaps because three defections often leads to play stoppages. Cyclic ecologies, in which all or almost all individuals have a short repeating self-play string with both c's and d's (e.g. c : dc) also occur, but seem to be rare at any parameter setting.
When the standard scenario was perturbed by l o wering ! to 0.5, a particularly interesting ecology appeared whose average payo persisted near 2.0 over the nal 20 generations. Examining the player population for the very last generation, we discovered that the players were alternating mutual defections and mutual cooperations with each other, resulting in sequences of payo s of the form (::: 1 3 1 3 : : : ). This population contained two subpopulations, each of whose members preferred partners from the other group. Sometimes an ecology will transit to a wall ower ecology after persisting for some time in a more cooperative mode. As indicated in Table 4 , these rare late wall ower ecologies occur at di erent parameter values than the usual wall ower ecologies, for reasons that remain unclear.
Sensitivity t o P otential Behavioral Complexity
To test the sensitivity o f t h e e v olutionary outcomes to changes in the maximum permitted complexity of the players' IPD strategies, the number of states in the IPD machines for these strategies was reduced from 16 to one. Suprisingly, m a n y o f t h e n o vel behaviors resulting from the introduction of choice and refusal in the evolutionary IPD were not a ected by this apparently severe constraint. For one-state IPD machines, D 2 ecologies cannot arise and wall ower ecologies did not emerge at high values with W set equal to , apparently because the fraction of cooperators in the initial population was high cf. Table 2 . However, D 1 ecologies (in particular, Raquel-and-the-Bobs) are possible and were observed.
Floating and ! Studies
In some studies, rather than assuming that the players were characterized by xed commonlyshared values for the minimum tolerance level and the memory weight !, w e instead let these parameters constitute part of each p l a yer's genetic structure. For these simulations, we used the Moore-machine representation for the players' IPD strategies. 16 bits for each o f t h e two parameters were added to the bit strings used to code the Moore machine representations. These additional 16 bits were used to partition the allowable ranges for and ! into 2 16 intervals. For the oating study, the allowable range was set from 0 to 3 for the oating ! study, the allowable range was set from 0 to 1. In the initial population, the parameter, either or ! was chosen from a uniform distribution over the allowable range. Figure 10 shows what happened when was added to the genetic structure of each p l a yer, with all other parameters set at standard scenario levels (including W = 1 :6). We made 196 runs from di erent initial random seeds, with each run consisting of 2000 generations. The average across the 196 runs evolved to approximately 2:1. For these parameter settings, one sucker payo results in further refusal of play w h e n 2:1, so on average the runs were right at this important boundary. M o r e o ver, for all but the initial generations, the overall average tness across the 196 runs hovered around 2:8. Surprisingly, this is generally lower than the overall average tness achieved in the standard scenario case with held xed at W = 1 :6 see part (a) of Figure 4 .
When the ecologies were examined individually, h o wever, we found once again a rich variety of behaviors. The average values of for individual ecologies have a n i n teresting distribution (see Fig. 10(b) ). Average values tend to cluster in two i n tervals at later generations, (2.1-2.25) and (2.7-3.0). A third peak is observed around = 1.4, and there is a gap between this lower region and = 1 :7 w h i c h is uninhabited by a n y ecologies. Figure 10 (c) highlights the appearance of wall ower ecologies at high values. These wall ower ecologies help account for the lower average tness achieved with oating compared to the standard scenario with xed . T h us a high carries a signi cant risk, while at the same time allowing cooperative ecologies to protect themselves from less cooperative m utants.
When the above experiment w as repeated with a oating ! and with xed at its standard scenario level 1:6, the oating ! evolved on average to a very low l e v el. As for the oating case, the mean average tness reached was lower than for the standard scenario case, and this mean masked a rich v ariety of behaviors. These results are shown in Figure 11 . Interestingly, the mean value of ! never rose above 0 :53, the value where Q(L) = 1. However, the distribution of values against generation shows that many ecologies did in fact have high average !. L o w ! is associated with a large number of wall ower ecologies. Note that the regions of high and low distribution values in the oating ! contour plot of Figure 11 (c) are much less distinct than the analogous ones in the oating results. Figure 11 (d) once again shows the danger of being too intolerant of defection, for wall ower ecologies tend to be limited to the range (0-0.3).
Population Diversity
These small populations tend to quickly lose genetic diversity. T o a certain extent, this is an inherent property of small populations, but to a certain extent it is also an artifact of the way i n w h i c h w e h a ve implemented our genetic algorithm. If we increased the mutation rate, decreased the number of elite, or replaced elitism with reproduction proportional to tness, then presumably the tness regions would become noisier and convergence to a stable level of genetic diversity less likely. An e ect that we d i d n o t a n ticipate, however, is that the behavioral diversity of our populations is sensitive t o t h e c hoice of sorting algorithm used to select parents, even though the genetic diversity i s n o t .
More precisely, in most of our simulations we used a bubble-sort algorithm to rank The joint distribution of the mean average tness and the mean , a t t wo di erent angles across all runs and all generations. Mean average tness is plotted from 1 to 3 and mean from 0 to 3. The distribution of the mean ! for each generation. In this contour plot, levels are shaded from white at low density levels to dark at high levels. (d) The joint distribution of the mean average tness and the mean !, a t t wo di erent angles across all runs and all generations. Mean average tness is plotted from 1 to 3 and mean ! is plotted from 0 to 1. potential parents by tness. The bubble-sort algorithm is biased towards the incumbency of older players. That is, in cases where a subset of players all have the same tness, as often occurs, the players that achieved relatively higher rankings at the end of the previous generation are again ranked higher, making their survival more likely. This incumbency e ect, combined with our use of strong elitism (X = 20), tends to promote the evolution of behaviorally homogeneous populations. Use of a heap-sort algorithm gives slightly noisier results but in general does not appear to a ect our conclusions. Under a randomized sorting algorithm, however, the tness regions are noisier yet, and, although many of the features derived using bubble-sort remain, they are less prominent. For example, Raquel-and-the-Bobs ecologies occur much less frequently and regularly.
Concluding Remarks
The simulation studies reported in this paper, in the companion paper Smucker et al. (1994) , and in Stanley et al. (1994) indicate that permitting players in an evolutionary IPD to choose and refuse potential partners can have a signi cant e ect on the resulting dynamics. A key issue that remains to be explored, however, is whether the e ects we h a ve found are generic to choice and refusal or are closely tied to particular features of our implementation.
For example, our reliance on a synchronized genetic step, strong elitism, expected payo s, and a strict tolerance threshold may a ect our outcomes signi cantly. Also, using a xed convex combination of past expected payo and current p a yo in order to obtain an updated expected payo is too rigid and simplistic, even in the present context in which p l a yers have no prior knowledge of other players' strategies and payo s. Allowing the minimum tolerance level and the memory weight ! to evolve is a step towards increased exibility. A n o t h e r possibility w ould be to assume that the players use a look{ahead learning algorithm such as Q-learning (see Sandholm and Crites, this issue) to form and update evaluations of their potential game partners. More generally, h o wever, what would happen if players were free to evolve their partner selection mechanisms from a broader domain? Some players might exhibit a preference for those they have p l a yed before whereas others might d i s p l a y a taste for variety. Also, we m i g h t see the emergence of a more sophisticated form of anticipatory behavior in the form of signals among potential partners meant to in uence future partner selection.
Our long-term interest is to develop realistic models of human interactions in social and economic contexts. The addition of choice and refusal of partners using expected payo s is intended to be a step in that direction. However, the PD game is a caricature of social interactions. Applying the insights developed in the present paper to real situations will require the modeling of more speci c cases. In this issue Prechelt proposes that PD be replaced by the more complex and realistic INCA model for some types of pairwise interactions between sel sh agents. One of our original goals was to develop a model of sexual partner selection that could help in understanding and controlling the spread of AIDS, and PD is not a good model for those interactions. Another possible application is the study of economic processes based on local endogenously-determined agent i n teractions (see, for example, Durlauf, 1994 and Vriend, 1995) . Along these lines, Tesfatsion (1995) has developed a modi ed IPD/CR framework within which to study the formation and evolution of trading patterns among resource-constrained buyers and sellers who choose and refuse their potential trading partners.
